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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-1176 
 ___________ 
 
     ELIJAH CROSBY, 
       Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
JOSEPH J. PIAZZA; *SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS; JOHN W. KERESTES; DAVID W. MCANNANEY; MICHAEL 
MILLER; L.S. KERNS BARR; KANDIS K. DASCANI; SHARON M. BURKS; 
OFFICER MCCAHAN; OFFICER FORNWALD; OFFICER BENZA; JOHN/JANE 
DOE'S; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; MR. MORASKIE; SUPERINTENDENT 
COLEMAN; JOAN L. MANN; CANDICE MARIE LACKEY 
 
*(Pursuant to Rule 43(c), Fed. R. App. P.) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-00020 ) 
District Judge:  Honorable Edwin M. Kosik 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 17, 2012 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, VANASKIE and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed : February 29, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
PER CURIAM 
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 Elijah Crosby,  a state prisoner, appeals pro se from the order of the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting Defendants’ motions to 
dismiss.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand 
for further proceedings. 
I. 
 Crosby is a prisoner at SCI-Coal Township in Pennsylvania.  In January 2008, he 
filed a complaint in the District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as 
Defendants the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and eleven DOC 
employees.1  Crosby alleged violations of his constitutional rights by the Defendants 
arising out of their alleged involvement in searching his cell and subsequent misconduct 
hearings.  In August 2009, Crosby amended his complaint to include claims of retaliation 
and conspiracy and added four additional Defendants to the action.2
 In the original complaint, Crosby alleged that, in September 2006, while he was 
confined in the F-Block Unit of the prison, several of the Defendants came to his cell to 
escort him to the general intake area to collect an investigative urine sample.  After he 
was tested, Crosby alleged that Defendant Miller ordered two other DOC employees to 
 
                                              
1 Those Defendants are: Joseph Piazza, Jeffrey Beard, John Kerestes, David McAnnaney, 
Michael Miller, L.S. Kerns-Barr, Kandis Dascani, Sharon Burks and Officers McCahan, 
Fornwald, and Benza. 
 
2 Those Defendants are: Superintendent Coleman, Joan L. Mann, Candice Marie Lackey, 
and “Mr. Moraskie.” 
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place him in an observation cell.  Later that day, Crosby’s cell was searched and he was 
issued a misconduct for possession of contraband. 
 The following month, Crosby received a second misconduct after officials again 
found contraband and a controlled substance in his cell.  Crosby was afforded hearings on 
both misconducts before Defendant Kerns-Barr.  In October 2006, Crosby was found to 
have possessed the contraband referred to in the first misconduct.  Later that month, 
Crosby was found to have possessed the controlled substance and the contraband which 
was the subject of the second misconduct. 
 Crosby thereafter filed numerous grievances relating to the investigation and 
hearings.  The grievances were dismissed.  Crosby subsequently filed his section 1983 
complaint alleging that: 1) his cell was searched without notice in violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights; 2) his personal property was illegally confiscated during those 
searches; and 3) he was denied due process during the misconduct proceedings. 
 In his supplemental complaint, Crosby alleged that several of the original 
defendants and several additional Defendants conspired against him for having filed an 
administrative grievance as to the misconduct, and later retaliated against him for doing 
so by filing the second misconduct and requiring him to enroll in various treatment 
programs.  He also alleged that Defendant Moraskie violated his rights by providing false 
information in support of the issuance of the second misconduct.   
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 Crosby sued the Defendants in both their official and individual capacities and 
sought both monetary damages and an injunction preventing them from adding any 
additional programs to his correctional plan which might interfere with his parole. 
Defendants moved to dismiss the action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  See
II. 
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Crosby then filed a second motion to 
supplement his complaint to add new claims against additional Defendants.  In a January 
2011 order, the District Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss and denied Crosby 
an opportunity to further supplement his complaint.  Crosby timely appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, see Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F. 3d 
420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001), and we may affirm the judgment “on any basis which finds 
support in the record,” see Bernitsky v. United States, 620 F.2d 948, 950 (3d Cir. 1980).  
A motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead “enough facts to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility 
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal
 As an initial matter, the District Court properly dismissed Crosby’s claims for 
money damages against the DOC, 
, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974), as 
well as the other named Defendants to the extent they were acting in their official 
capacities.  Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit for money damages against a 
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state agency and state officials sued in their official capacities.  See Melo v. Hafer
 We also affirm the dismissal of Defendants Beard, Piazza, Kerestes, Dascani, 
Burks, and Coleman from the action because Crosby failed to allege that they were 
personally involved in any wrongdoing.  
, 912 
F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990). 
See Rode v. Dellarciprete
 
, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 
(3d Cir. 1988) (“[A] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in 
the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat 
superior.”). 
 Crosby first alleged that Defendant Kerns-Barr denied him due process at his 
misconduct hearings because he was not permitted to present witnesses, conduct cross-
examination of a confidential witness, and personally test the chemical powder found in 
his cell.  In 
Due Process Claim 
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a 
prisoner facing the deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest following 
an administrative hearing has a due process right to certain procedural protections.   
Specifically, at a prison disciplinary hearing, due process requires that the inmate: (1) 
appear before an impartial decision-making body; (2) be given not less than 24 hours 
written notice of the charges against him; (3) be afforded the opportunity to call witnesses 
and present documentary evidence; (4) be permitted assistance from an inmate 
representative; and (5) receive a written decision explaining the decision-maker’s 
conclusions.  Id. at 563-71.  However, an inmate’s due process rights are not triggered 
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unless the prison “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to 
the ordinary incidents of prison life.”  Sandin v. Conner
 Crosby was placed in RHU for a total of 270 days after he was found guilty of 
both misconducts.  We have held that this type of confinement does not constitute an 
“atypical and significant hardship” under 
, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).   
Sandin.  See Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 
706 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that fifteen months in segregation was not an atypical and 
significant hardship); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that 
seven months’ disciplinary confinement “does not, on its own, violate a protected liberty 
interest as defined in Sandin
 Therefore, because Crosby’s disciplinary confinement did not impose an atypical 
and significant hardship, and thus did not deprive him of a protected liberty interest, the 
procedural due process protections of 
.”)   
Wolff did not apply to his hearing.  Moreover, even 
under Wolff
 
, Crosby would not have been permitted to test the materials that were found 
in his cell. 
 Crosby also alleged that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because 
Defendants Miller, Fornwald, Benza, and McCahan failed to provide him with notice that 
his cell would be searched.  He also claimed that in conjunction with the cell search, 
certain commissary items were illegally removed from his cell.  The District Court did 
not err in dismissing this claim because, as the Supreme Court has held, “the Fourth 
Illegal Search 
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Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the 
confines of the prison cell.”  Hudson v. Palmer
 We also affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Crosby’s claim concerning the 
confiscation of his property.  Deprivation of inmate property by prison officials does not 
give rise to cognizable due process claim if the prisoner has an adequate post-deprivation 
state remedy.  
, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).   
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.  Adequate remedies were available here as 
Crosby was provided an opportunity to file an administrative grievance.  See Tillman v. 
Lebanon County Corr., 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000).  As the District Court correctly 
noted, to the that extent Crosby is dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative 
process, he may still file a state court tort action.  Hudson
 
, 468 U.S. at 535.    
 The District Court also correctly dismissed Crosby’s claim against Defendant 
Moraskie.  Crosby alleged that Moraskie violated his constitutional rights by providing 
false information regarding the items that were confiscated from his cell in connection 
with the first misconduct.  The filing of false disciplinary charges does not constitute a 
claim under § 1983 so long as the inmate was granted a hearing and an opportunity to 
rebut the charges.  
Defendant Moraskie 
Mensinger, 293 F.3d at 653-54 (3d Cir. 2002); Freeman v. Rideout, 
808 F.2d 949, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1986).  Crosby does not allege that he was denied a 
hearing.  Therefore, to the extent he asserted a due process violation, the District Court 
properly dismissed the claim. 
Retaliation Claims 
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 Crosby next alleged that Defendants Piazza, Miller, McAnnaney, Kerestes, and 
Kerns-Barr issued the second misconduct report against him in retaliation for his having 
filed an administrative grievance after he was issued the first misconduct.  He also claims 
that, as a result of filing his complaint, he is now required to attend additional treatment 
programs which will impede his ability to seek parole.  
  Section 1983 imposes liability for retaliatory conduct by prison officials if the 
conduct was motivated “in substantial part by a desire to punish [the] individual for the 
exercise of a constitutional right,” Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)), such as 
filing lawsuits and grievances related to incarceration.  See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 
523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003); Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981).  To 
prevail on a section 1983 retaliation claim, the prisoner must prove: (1) that the conduct 
leading to the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected; (2) that he suffered an 
adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his 
constitutional rights; and (3) that his protected conduct was a substantial or motivating 
factor in the decision to discipline him.  See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 
2001).  However, “prison officials may still prevail by proving that they would have 
made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a 
legitimate penological interest.”  Id.
 The District Court dismissed Crosby’s claim that the Defendants issued the second 
misconduct report against him in retaliation for his having an administrative grievance, 
 at 334.  
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reasoning that the multiple grievance decisions in the record demonstrate that the 
Defendants would have taken the same action irrespective of any desire to retaliate 
against Crosby.  The standard applied by the District Court, arguably appropriate at the 
summary judgment stage, was incorrectly applied to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  
The question before the District Court was whether Crosby stated a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.  Based on the pleadings, we conclude that Crosby made out a 
prima facie case of retaliation; dismissal was therefore inappropriate.3
 We are also unable to affirm, under 
 
Iqbal
Crosby’s claim that, in retaliation for filing the instant civil action, he has been required 
to complete several treatment programs which will interfere with his ability to seek 
parole.  The District Court determined that Crosby failed to state a claim for relief under 
, the District Court’s dismissal of  
Rauser
 We cannot determine from either the supplemental complaint, or Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss, whether Crosby, by his placement in these programs, has been 
 because he failed to allege an actual injury.  Specifically, the Court determined 
that because Crosby has no right to parole under Pennsylvania law, such an argument is 
not viable. 
                                              
3 We will affirm the dismissal of Crosby’s related conspiracy claim, however.  Crosby 
alleged that Defendants Miller, Piazza, Kerestes, and Burns conspired to issue the second 
misconduct after Crosby filed a grievance following the issuance of the first misconduct.  
We agree with the District Court that Crosby’s conspiracy claim is deficient because 
absent from his complaint are allegations of at least some facts which could permit a 
reasonable inference of a conspiracy to be drawn.  See, e.g., Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 
141, 148 (3d Cir. 1998) (mere “conclusory allegations of concerted action” are 
insufficient to satisfy the notice-pleading standard). 
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significantly impeded from seeking parole or whether he is subject to only a minor delay.  
We disagree, however, that the fact that Crosby has no state or federal right to parole 
means that prison officials may, with impunity, impede his eligibility to seek parole in 
retaliation for his filing suit against them.  Presumably, the District Court will grant 
Crosby leave to amend his complaint so that he may clarify the impact that his enrollment 
in these programs has on his ability to seek parole.  
 Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order as to Crosby’s retaliation 
claims and will remand for further proceedings.4
 
 
 Finally, Crosby argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion for leave 
to file a second supplemental complaint.  As mentioned, in that motion, Crosby sought to 
add new claims against additional Defendants.  The District Court may permit a party to 
file a supplemental pleading “setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that 
happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.”  
Second Supplemental Complaint 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d).  
We review the denial of leave to file a supplemental complaint for abuse of discretion.  
Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp.
 We find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Crosby 
leave to supplement his complaint.  Although Crosby’s second supplemental complaint 
, 614 F.3d 57, 73 (3d Cir. 2010).   
                                              
4 We note that the District Court did not rule on Crosby’s request that the Court issue an 
injunction prohibiting the Defendants from adding additional programs to his correctional 
plan which would further interfere with his parole.  On remand, the District Court should  
also address that request as well. 
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included actions which occurred after he filed his original complaint, they involve claims 
of retaliation against parties other than the named Defendants.  The District Court was 
within its discretion when it found that granting leave to supplement would delay the 
disposition of the claims against those Defendants, thereby causing them prejudice.   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in part, vacate in 
part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Crosby’s “Motion 
to Request Leave to Supplement the Record and Add to Appendix” is denied.  His 
“Motion for Leave to Submit Response to Motion that is in Front of the Panel” is also 
denied.   
